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One may confidently predict for the work a grateful reception by teachers of Virgil, and a fulfillment of the author's hope that it "may assist the pupil in school and at home to a fuller appreciation of the power and beauty of the great Roman poet."

The publishers are to be congratulated upon the attractive appearance of the volume.

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*The Forms of Prose Literature*, by J. H. GARDINER, Instructor in English at Harvard College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900. xiii + 498 pp. \$1.50.

A TEACHER of rhetoric has reason for rejoicing when he finds in the preface of a book on rhetoric and composition an acknowledgment of obligation to Professor James's *Principles of Psychology*, for what is just now particularly needed in the field of rhetoric is the psychological interpretation of rhetorical principles by scholars who are trained in both sciences. Such an acknowledgment is made in the preface of Mr. Gardiner's large and attractive volume on the Forms of Prose, and an examination of the contents of the volume shows that the acknowledgment is not made without reason. Unfortunately for the cause of scientific rhetoric, however, Mr. Gardiner, although he knows his psychology so well, uses it less as an instrument of investigation than as an intellectual stimulant. For this, perhaps, his environment is responsible. There are colleges, I believe, where, traditionally, rhetoric is held to be not a science, but an art. A teacher in one of these colleges, and a high authority in rhetoric, has said that rhetoric "neither observes, nor discovers, nor classifies." I fear that Mr. Gardiner wrote under the spell of this anathema. To be sure, he observes, he discovers, and he classifies, as every writer on rhetoric has done since the time of Corax; but he is afraid he will be caught at it. He shakes the boughs of the Tree of Knowledge with a furtive glance behind him, and on slight provocation bolts into the broad highway of Conventional Precept. Let us wish him greater courage in his next attempt. Meanwhile, in the present dearth of original investigation in rhetoric, we may be thankful for small favors.

The book consists of two parts, an introductory part on the theory of the forms of prose and the art of writing them, and an illustrative part. In the introduction Mr. Gardiner attempts to classify prose discourse on psychological principles. To do so he calls attention to the two elements of which all experience is compounded, Thought and Feeling. These elements, though they are found in all literature, are combined in varying proportions in its different types. If feeling is in preponderance we have the Literature of Feeling; if thought is in preponderance we have the Literature of Thought. Thus far all is plain sailing, though the classification really takes us very little beyond DeQuincy's Literature of Knowledge, and Literature of Power. But now we meet one of the most difficult and baffling of rhetorical problems. How, upon this same principle, may we logically derive and distinguish the commonly accepted forms, description, narration, exposition, argument, and persuasion? Here, where we need most help, Mr. Gardiner leaves us in the lurch. "These divisions," he says, "are artificial and largely arbitrary," and he goes on to say: "After simplifying the matter

so much, it may seem a blind and wanton complication to turn back, as I must now do, from two categories to five. The complication, however, is only apparent. The learning of every art is really simplified by beginning with certain artificial motions: if you are learning even to box or to fence, you begin with stiff and simple movements and strokes which you can hardly recognize in the swift and flexible precision of the accomplished art. Just so when you are learning to write, you will get on much faster if you begin with problems in which your materials and your results are highly simplified. These simple problems you will find in the old categories of the rhetoric—Exposition, Argument, Criticism, Narrative, Description. In each of these, as I shall go on to show, the respective importance of the elements of thought and of feeling can be specifically and clearly settled; and by thus attacking each problem in its simplest form you can see much more easily and clearly how to work."

In other words, our attitude to these five rhetorical categories should be like Kant's attitude to the idea of God—although we cannot prove that they exist, we should still behave to them just as if they were real and significant! This is virtually an abandonment of the problem of classification, and nowhere in what follows, in spite of the most elaborate and painstaking treatment, does Mr. Gardiner succeed in recovering the lost ground. We learn that exposition, as the representative embodiment of thought, lies at one pole of discourse, and that description, as the representative embodiment of feeling, lies at the other, and that between them somewhere in this wide bed lie argument, narrative, criticism (a strange bedfellow) and persuasion; but whether these forms have sprung from a common ancestor, and if so, how they are related one to another, are questions to which the author returns no satisfactory answer. The truth is that the thought-emotion theory with which he sets out does not furnish a sufficient clue to a philosophic interpretation of the old categories, even if we distinguish (as Mr. Gardiner does not) the various rhetorical applications of the term emotion. Argument is not exposition plus feeling, narrative is not description plus thought. No emotional or intellectual heightening of any of the other types will result in criticism (if criticism be a distinct category). The rationale of the classification rests on a different basis.

In other respects, also, the author's reasoning is not wholly above suspicion. Thus, on p. 19, after dwelling upon feeling as a distinguishing mark of description and narrative, as compared with exposition, he goes on to say: "Of course both narrative and description enter largely into many explanations, but since their purpose is so different I shall include them in the discussion of explanatory writing. *Here I am speaking only of such stories and descriptions as are written to amuse a reader and stir his feelings.*" This is as if he should say that the distinguishing mark of a politician is speculation, and then add that he is speaking only of politicians who embezzle.

But if we must look askance at the teacher turned psychologist, we can feel for the teacher on his own ground nothing but admiration. As mentor to young writers, Mr. Gardiner is unqualifiedly successful. His suggestions in this book are shrewd, practical, and thought-provoking, and are imparted with a fairness and an amenity that are irresistible. He has the rare gift of simple and unaffected conversation. Moreover, the stream of talk, though everywhere bright and clear, is nowhere shallow. Partly as the result of his psychological studies, perhaps, the author inclines to the profounder view of the problems, not only of expression, but of life. Thus, in discussing the plot of narrative, he says: "The sequence of cause and effect in fiction, as in

life, is one of the facts which are always poignant. In life one thing does follow another; and the tracing out and noting of the inevitable sequence has an unfailing fascination. If you wish to give your story substance, therefore, and, perhaps to leave it as an addition to the wisdom of mankind, make the chain of consequences in your story obvious though unobtrusive. This sequence, the necessary result of human conduct, and the inscrutable workings of fate, have been the material of story-makers from the dawn of literature to our own present day. With the Greeks it was personified; it was Nemesis, the vengeance of the gods, punishing the house of the Atreidae for their pride and presumption by blindness to what they were doing. In our drier way we reduce it to a matter of evolution or of conservation of energy, to the law of heredity, and of the survival of the fittest. But however we phrase it, the explanation of human happiness and misfortunes and the resolution of them to their causes, is a perennial fascination to the human mind."

How refreshing this, after the dandling and beslobbering and trivializing of the subject which we find in many recent text-books.

The illustrative part of the book is more difficult to criticise than the first part, for the reason that it is almost impossible to tell in advance how any given example will endure the shock of the recitation process. Judging *a priori*, the specimen from Darwin's *Origin of Species*, on p. 181, seems peculiarly unfortunate for an opening selection. The genealogical tree which stands just within the threshold will not, I fear, be attractive to young persons. It offers to them no shade. It is, indeed, a tree of life, but not "Des Leben's goldner Baum" of the poet. It would be better in a course of this kind, if my experience is a guide, to begin with something more concrete. Theoretically a teacher ought to begin with prose that is highly abstract and skeleton-like, and pass by degrees to prose that is warm, full-blooded and highly colored; and this is what Mr. Gardiner has done. In practice, however, it makes little difference where you begin, provided the selection is interesting and the problem it presents is simple, or can be made simple. And a beginning once made, the natural order of progression would seem to be from the simple and concrete to the complex and abstract.

Again, and still judging *a priori*, the example from Professor James's *Will to Believe* is an injudicious selection as an illustration of argument, because it is itself an attempt to prove the legitimacy of a certain argumentative process. To ask a student to keep one eye on Mr. Gardiner's theory of argument, another eye on Professor James's theory of argument, and a third eye on Professor James's exemplification of Mr. Gardiner's theory, is to ask more than the normally constituted vertebrate is fitted to perform.

The remaining examples are uniformly good. If any exception is to be taken, it is to their modernity. Is it not well to temper these hot-head evolutionary Stevensons and Collinses and La Farges by mixing with them some of the remoter and less strenuous masters of prose?

The book is, in general, carefully edited. Nevertheless, a few slips must be noted: p. 55, line 7, the grammatical office of *nearly* is not clear; p. 59, second line from the bottom, *will* is omitted; p. 89, the word *the* is missing at the end of line 18; p. 139, it is not clear to how much of the preceding discussion *therefore* is illative; pp. 133, 134, 157, 163, 166, the references to pages in the second part of the book are uniformly wrong; p. 281, the reference to the *Will to Believe* should be pp. 1-31; p. 282, the reference to Professor James's chapter on "Reasoning" should be p. 325, not

323, the latter reference in the contents of Professor James's book being a typographical error.

A more serious mistake (worse than a crime, I should suppose, in the eyes of a Harvard man) occurs on p. 136. There the author says that in Stevenson's *Kidnapped* "the baking day on the rock" follows naturally though necessarily "from David's sleepiness on watch." Not so. The baking day on the rock is in chapter xx; David falls asleep on watch in chapter xxii.

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